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Terrence Matthews
4 Goldfork Circle Drive #4
Idaho City, Idaho 8371
Petitioner-Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF LDAHO

Ten-ence Matthews,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Dennis Sallaz, Daryl Sallaz, National )
Financial Services, Randolf Lewis, )

Docket No. 43311
District Court CVOC 1306926

APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN

REPLY BRIEFS

)
)

Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
for Ada County.
The Honorable Patrick Owen presiding.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The respondents are right, this case deals with damages from the loss of a residential
property located at 1911 Second Street South, Nampa Idaho as the result of a deed of
trust foreclosure that occurred in March 2013.

And if the respondents did not admitted

to (in their Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment)

forgery (documents submitted to dismiss the case in Canyon

County to support res judicata claims in Ada County), perjury (testifying that payments
were made to catch up their payments in the arrears), abuse of process (in both federal
bankruptcy laws and Idaho Statutes and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure). And the case
was dismissed under the Judges' Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment which under res judicata, but never addressed the
issues of forgery, pe1jury, and wrongful foreclosure. The district court judge concluded
in his Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment until March 16, 2015, CR128-129, saying that "The ownership interests in the
Nampa home were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself
and Jacqueline. Each became a 50% owner. The divorce court determined that the
Nampa home was community property. That finding has never been appealed. In
connection with the divorce, .Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount of $3,400.
When the assignee of the attorney's claim and lien.filed to.foreclose that lien, the lien amount
was alleged to have grown by a factor of about 10, to more than $32,000. Due to
Jacqueline's default, the attorney's assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50%
interest .fiJr a credit bid of a fraction <?f the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's
50% interest in the Nampa home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lienforeclosure
action. Neither Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any
action affecting Matthews' 50% interest. The lien foreclosure court ruled that Matthews
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lacked standing to assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded
vu,nm,u.,,,from litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in
2009 lien foreclosure action The ruling in the 2009 lien foreclosure case
c~f the issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009

lienforeclosure action. As a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counseljbr defendants is
directed to submit an appropriate form ofjudgment within ten (1 OJ days of the entry of this
decision."

The court said basically res judicata only applies to the issues in the Canyon

County Court that this court discussed in his memorandum, but no mentioned on the
issues of what transpired in the Ada County Courts and what led to the present lawsuit
court ruling. Even though there was no final judgment in the Canyon County
case.

Since the final judgment came about and signed after appellant filed another

lawsuit, which Dennis Sallaz got Judge Ford to allow them to file a forged Motion to
Order and Judgment to support Sallaz' Motion for Summary Judgment in
appellant's complaint filed in Ada County, (and supposedly Judge Ford informed Sallaz
that he needed to file documents to close this case without infom1ing the appellant
according to Sallaz' affidavit). So in essence there was no final judI::,'111ent in the Canyon
County case.
And appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 19, 2015 addressing
the dismissal of this case.

Saying "This comt appears to rely res judicata claims

addressing 'same parties' 'same claims' saying 'there are three prior proceedings to the
current action'

The divorce action the 2009 attorney lien foreclosure and the 2011

action. The first action did not claim forgery and fraud upon the court. The second claim
made the allegations when Defendant Sallaz forged documents and submitted them to the
Ada County Court to claim res judicata. There was no final judgment until after filing

the claim in Ada County."

The claims that Judge McKee could not address were never addressed in his court
because it happened after a complaint was filed that the defendants committed fraud.
And it was not until after the ruling in Judge McKee's court that they committed perjury,
submitting false documents, and fraud.

APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN

REPLY BRIEFS

5

A hearing was heard on this matter on April 23, 2014, appellant argued issues on
res judicata did not apply to issues after the trial where appellant got back 50 percent, and
not

rents or a share of because the respondents paid the arrears

payments current, showing documentation of a cashier check and ledger. And Judge
Owen not addressing these issues presented in the Motion to Reconsider, says in a
surprise, not to be challenged ruling that this ever being an issue, nor ever addressed, nor
was appellant allowed to even address this, the judge says (no matter how defendants
came about getting the property) says that the appellant was responsible for the payments
on

property. (This alone is grounds for appeal when not allowed to defend or address

a surprise ruling). An Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 27,
2015.

A second Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 27, 2025, the same day
Judge Owen the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration was filed..
questioned:

Which

(1) Did this court allow the plaintiff to address the new ruling this court

made for the defendants? No. This court never allowed the plaintiff to address his
argument for the defendants.

After the court made a new ruling on nothing ever

addressed as a defense by the defendants, and completely caught plaintiff by surprise,
this court ended saying are there any other matters to discuss in this court?

Where if

asked if plaintiff wanted to address this surprise 'bombshell' ruling, the plaintiff who did
not bring the paperwork wanted to bring up prior statements made by both courts, and
testimony by defendants, so would have asked for a continuance to research this under
'implied contracts'. Or what Judge Ford ordered plaintiff's (defendants) to do. Or that
Plaintiff could not make payments if not 'sole owner' before quit claiming property to
Randolf Lewis and the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had a right to address an issue that this

court for the first time brings to the plaintiff's attention. (defendant's may have been
aware of this since they did not defend against the allegations made by plaintiff in which
the defendant's attorney never said one word and didn't even take notes) . . . (1) Was
the plaintiff responsible for payments on the lien on the Nampa property after the Sheriff
foreclosed on the property? This court ruled that plaintiff was responsible for the loan
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRJTTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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on the property.

When in fact the sole owner of the property on foreclosure was

for the loan on the Nampa property, when Judge Ford said that Idaho
was to be

off first. And when they chose to keep the property, they

responsible for payments made to Idaho Housing, even if the loan was still
plai.ntiff s name.

Since foreclosure and until plaintiff was given back 50% percent

interest in the property, the defendant's were responsible to ensure the payments were
made to Idaho Housing. Plaintiff was 011Jy responsible since given 50% percent interest
in the property, and the property was foreclosed upon for payments not made since the
'sole owners' took possession of the property. Because Idaho Housing would not have
foreclosed on the property if the payments were paid since the trial.
The court ruled on this matter in May 19th, 2015, without addressing the surprise
ruling on if the appellant was responsible for payments between sheriff's sale and when
awarded back 50 percent of the property on, CR 166-167, saying "it appearing that the
motion is untimely under I.R.C.P. 59 (e), and is not permitted as a post-judgment motion
for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) of an order made by the Court under either
Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and therefore the Court being fully informed"
And 71 days after the final judgment the respondents filed a Memorandum for
Fees, now saying the Motion to Reconsider was timely filed in order to attempt
to stop any appeal of this cases. Which was discussed in the appellants brief at page 21
saying "Seventy-one days after the Judgment the defendants filed a Memorandum of
Costs, saying now the Motions to Reconsider were timely filed, but would not address
surprise ruling by Judge Patrick Owen on appellant being responsible for payments
between 2010 and 2013 when the property was sold at sheriffs sale and when the
appellant was awarded 50% of the property, which the court said only 7 payments due
after the court ruling were affected by the foreclosure."

Then the court would not

address the Motion to Reconsider as ·untimely'.
B. Course of Proceedings Addressing Respondent's Arguments

Now the respondents say at page 6, "Matthews filed a timely motion for
reconsideration on March 19, 2015. . . and "Matthews then filed a second motion for
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WR1TTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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reconsideration on May 7, 2015, which was denied by the District Court May 19, 2015"
out that the court cannot address this Motion to Reconsider because it was filed
The confusion lied with the fact both the court and respondents both
the Judge's Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second Motion
Summary Judgment was a final judgment and would not acknowledge till after an
appeal was filed and appellant argued the memorandum of fees exceeded the judge's
ruling before the court and respondents now acknowledged that the Motions to

Reconsider were filed in a timely matter, but left out the documents, and any mention
that appellant was responsible for payments in a surprise ruling. So if now the Second
Motion to Reconsider was filed timely, why was it not addressed? But the repository
shows the Second Motion to Reconsider was filed and a copy attached to the Appellant's
Brief filed wth the court not disputed.

Add the Order Denying Second Motion to

Reconsider document was entered into the record.
Addressing Respondent's Statement of Facts C:

The respondents in order to

state that appellant was responsible for payments bet\veen sheriffs sale in 2010 and
awarded back 50 percent of the property says at page 8 in their Response Brief,
that "Appellant Mathews was a part owner between 1999 and 2013." Leaving out the
period that appellant did not have any deed to the property. When in fact the Sheriffs
Sale which directed the sale to payoff Idaho Housing first, the whole amount owed to
the respondent's second and then divide the proceeds between appellant and
respondents, shows the respondents were responsible for payoff/payments on the
property in the interim until appellant was awarded the property back. The respondents
say at page 11, "The Sallaz attorney's fee lien, as construed below, was only imposed
against Mitchell's undivided half interest in the Nampa property.

(so why did the

sheriffs sale attach the over $37,000 against the property to be paid off before dividing
the proceeds?)

At page 13, the respondents say (which is an issue to contend with)

"Matthews' continuing obligation as the sole individual responsible on the underlying
note and deed of trust to IHF A remained unimpaired as a result of the Canyon County
foreclosure action. (which is saying between the Sheriff Sale and when awarded 50 %
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY
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interest in the property in 2013, appellant who was no longer on any title or deed was
responsible for the payments on the property?)
The respondents say at page 16, "Shortly thereafter (court ruling that payments
were caught up and made current) Mr. Lewis ceased making the monthly payments on
the property and moved out of the residence ... (when in fact payments were in the
an·ears since the last payment made by appellant in September 2010).

So how can Mr.

Lewis cease making payments when he nor Sallaz until he signed over to the property to
Lewis ever made a payment on the property?
111e respondents say at page 17, pertaining to the check testified to and submitted
to the court, "That check was in fact tendered and was included by IHFA's transaction
history for the loan" (An admission

no where did they say when they never made

payments on the place did they state appellant was responsible for the payments,
otherwise the court would have probably given the property back or given them control
of the property) ... Matthews had failed to establish that anyone within the Sallaz group
of defendants had any enforceable obligation to make the payments secured by the deed
trust. (How about Judge Ford's ruling that Idaho Housing and Finance be paid off
first at Sheriff's sale?) If this was true then why didn't Judge McKee give appellant
back control of the property, saying because they caught up the payments and were
cmrent on payments they would have physical and financial use of the property?

A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment For The
Defendant Respondents On Res Judicata saying that res judicata was the basis to
deny admitted (1) forgery. Then talks about the Canyon County case that had
nothing to do with forgery.

Forgery was committed in Canyon County when

Raymond Schild came forward and said the documents to sell the Nampa property
were not authorized, condoned, typed or submitted by him ...

(2) perjury. Is

"likewise barred by res judicata in this proceeding." P.25 response briefs ...

(3)

Circumvention Of Civil & Bankruptcy Rules (Abuse of Process) -- res judicata
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may apply here, except the appellant did appeal this action and the Supreme Court
essentiaily that even as co-defendant, appellant cannot argue procedural issues
wrongs done by both the court (absolute immunity) and attorneys for Jacqueline
Mitchell. That may be the only issue that can be precluded if a trial is granted ...

It is interesting at page 26 of Respondent's brief said underlined determines that
title to the subiect propertv is held 50% by National and is encumbered by
the first lien of IHF A (then not bolded showing National takes most of
appellants share of the property) and the second lien of National.

And again

says "proceeds to be disbursed to payy off the first lien of IHF A, then to pay off
the second lien held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally
between Defendant Matthews and National." That shows that any sale would be
for anyone to bid on it to pay off over $80,000. But this is just added information
not related to the Argument, but helps explain that the respondents had
encumbered appellant's 50 % percent. (4) The Alleged "Wrongful foreclosure"
Of The Nampa Property In 2013 As Allegedly Caused By Acts Of The
Defendants/Respondents - - at page 28, the respondents state (at court in 2012),
the subject property was now titled in the names of, and held by, Terrence
Matthews and Randolf Lewis. It was not until appellant received the quit claim
deed in 2012 and they gave the appellant and the court an accounting of moneys
paid to IFHA that the appellant would become responsible for payments. It was
only because the respondents caught up and kept the payments current that
allowed them to have physical control of the property. And that correctly ended
the lawsuit and the complaint was dismissed. But the respondent is incorrect
when they said that "Matthews and Lewis had been cotenants of the Nampa
property for about 2 years."

It was October

5th ,

2012. And the property was

foreclosed upon in March, 2013 so in essence appellant would only be liable for 6
months of payments, because the judge would have given appellant physical use
of the property to avoid foreclosure since he did not know that appellant was
responsible for the payments.
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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B. The Appellant Matthews Has Failed to. Raise Any Issue On This Appeal That
Challenged Decision Of The District Court Granting Summary Judgment To The
Respondents

The respondents say that the complete record was not used to

support his claims.

And records for what ever reason was not included, the

appellant took from the repository and document that were not put forth from the
repository the appellant attached that document.

The record produced to this

court from the repository which addresses the Second Motion to Reconsider
shows that Judge Owen made a surprise ruling and the Order Dismissing the
Action shows it was dismissed as 'untimely', when it was not.

Just like the

record shows that Judge Owen only addressed the Canyon County Court rulings

in his res judicata. And that is from the RECORD ... At page 33, respondents
say "Matthews undivided half interest in the Nampa property was unaffected by
the lien of foreclosure sale." When in fact at the time of the sheriff sale appellant
lost the property, had no deed, when the whole property was sold in March 2010.
Then respondents argue at page 34 -36, address that the disparity of how an
Attorney Lien went from $3,400 to $34,000 was in no position to object to this ...
and discusses a couple cases which appellant will further argue in his arguments ..
. And respondents stated that Idaho Code 5-216 applies a five (5) year statute of
limitations on an action on a contract. . . Again issues dealing with legal
procedure can be ignored if the defendant does not answer the complaint. . . In
alleged perjury, the sworn testimony and documents presented to show the court
the payments were current were disingenuous at best.

INDINGENUOUS:

insincere, dishonest, untruthful, false, deceitful, duplicitous, lying, mendacious
hypocritical. Twice the Appellant raised issues on this appeal that challenged the
decision of the District Court in Granting Summary Judgment to the Respondents.

In appellant's brief pp 18-21, says, the first issued in filing his first Motion to
Reconsidered, says "Upon filing a Motion to Reconsider on March 19, 2015,
showing 41 exhibits (CR 135 - 163) appellant was going to submit to the court
saying "This court appears to rely res judicata claims addressing 'same
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN
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parties' 'same claims' saying 'there are three prior proceedings to the
current action' The divorce action the 2009 attorney lien foreclosure and
the 2011 action. The first action did not claim forgery and fraud upon the
court. The second claim made the allegations when Defendant Sallaz
forged documents and submitted them to the Ada County Court to claim
res judicata. There was no final judgment until after filing the claim in Ada
County. So the claims that Judge McKee could not address where never
addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was filed
that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling in
Judge McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false
documents, and fraud. And the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent
of the property then allowed the defendants to attach their lien to the
whole property again does not fall under res judicata. Finally this court
addresses Final Judgment: This court uses the divorce as the final
judgment to justify the defendants to justify the defendants circumventing
the statutes and rules of civil procedure of Idaho. Saying the 'Interest of
Justice' an exception to all claims when a gross wrong is done."

The second issue presented to this court said concerning the filing of
appellant's Second Motion to Reconsider, says "At a Hearing on April 23, 2015,
after a statement read to the court which appellant argued the issues that had
since transpired since the last court which do no fall under res judicata. Judge
Patrice Own stated that it was appellant's fault that the property was foreclosed
upon, that Jacqueline was not on the loan, and thus respondents were not on the
loan, and since appellant refused or failed to make payments on the Nampa
property it was appellant responsibility for making payments on the property.
And Judge Patrick Owen would not even put this into writing in any document
on this statement made. But appellant filed a Second Motion to Reconsider on
April 27t\ 2015 (Which was part of the record and will attach a copy as an
Plaintiff's Attachment# 3).
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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Portions of the Second Motion to Reconsider are read "the court said at
8, "In the pretrial order, I concluded that the Complaint as initially drafted
contained many issues not litigablc in this case.

Most of the

pertained to Plaintiff's attempt to relitigate issues fully resolved in the
County litigation (In other words none of plaintiffs business)

.. Other issues

would relate to issues presented after filing the lawsuit in the present case .... The
judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be held with proceeds to be
disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA, then to pay off the second lien
held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally between
Defendant Matthews and National. . . . Now since they were ordered to pay off
IHF A first in their bid, and choose not to, then they would be responsible to
payoff, make payments or ensure that Idaho Housing and Finance Association
were kept current. As sole owners they chose to keep the property, so they would
be liable to keep payments current or sell off the property and payoff Idaho
Housing. The credit bid guaranteed that Idaho Housing was covered, which was
not used or applied to the bid. Except plaintiff was awarded half, and would not
be liable on the loan until given or awarded half the property, since the property
was taken awav from him, he was not liable for any loan. In fact, plaintiff would
not be liable until he got 50 percent ownership of the property. . . and even if
circumvented Federal Bankruptcy laws, it don't apply. So in essence they admit
everything.

And plaintiff argued these issues showing they are responsible and

could be held liable for their acts.

But the court dismissed this case based on res

judicata and filed this under the guise in a Memorandum Decision and Order RE:
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment which was filed March 4tn,
2015. Not a Notice to Dismiss or even an Order to Dismiss.
an 'Order Dismissing Case' or the like.

It should have been

So the plaintiff files a Motion to

Reconsider after document was mailed to wrong address, and the defendants
argue every issue is subject to this courts res judicata claims ... at page 27 - 28 as
Plaintiffs Attachment #2 says "So the claims that Judge McKee could not address
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY
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where never addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was
filed that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling
McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false documents,
and fraud. And the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent of the property
then allowed the defendants to attach their lien to the whole property again does
not fall under res judicata.

Finally this court addresses Final Judgment. This

court uses the divorce as the final judgment to justify the defendants to justify the
defendants circumventing the statutes and rules of civil procedure of Idaho.
Saying the 'Interest of Justice' an exception to all claims when a gross wrong is
done."

That "Motions for Reconsideration must be evaluated in light of the

doctrine of the law of the case and a court may only revisit and reverse a prior
ruling ... on one of five specified grounds ... (I) a clearly erroneous prior ruling,
(3) substantially different evidence, (5) (especially in that manifest injustice
would result were the prior ruling permitted to stand ... Failure to apply the
doctrine of the law of the case absent one of the [five] requisite conditions
constitutes an abuse of discretion. US v Alexander 106 F3d 874, 876 (9th Cir
1997)."

The Respondents ,\re Entitled to .An Award of Attorney's Fees On Appeal Under
LC 12-12-121

Since this case is not frivolous, since the Dismissal of

appellant's Summary Judgment under the Judge's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE; PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT does not apply res
judicata to actions after the Canyon County Court, and the Court at appellant's Motion
for Reconsideration did not address any res judicata issues, made a ruling without
opportunity to address the ruling, then filed another Motion to Reconsider to have it
denied as 'untimely'. And issues of admitted perjury, forgery, and fraud are issues not
addressed in appellant's summary judgment, so res judicata does not apply. Now that
they admit to this in their memorandum it opens the door to actual admissions to
allow the court to sanction Dennis Sallaz.
D. This Court Should Impose Sanctions Under Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Against
Appellant Matthews For Pursuing Issues That He Does Not Have Standing To
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Talk about the kettle being painted black.

Raise and Present To The Courts

Anytime someone files a complaint, it is through Discovery and Production of
Documents, Summary Judgement, and Hearings that the truth comes out. Justice
is supposedly after the truth.

This is whether one goes into civil or criminal

courts, federal district or federal bankruptcy courts. The appellant got most of his
documents from the respondents; the cashier check that respondents already
admitted they testified it was to cure a default, and a ledger showing payments
were current. The Affidavit admitting circumventing Federal Bankruptcy Laws.
The Memorandum in Opposition of Summary Judgment with a lot of admissions
to breaking the law. Maybe appellant can't raise all stuff allowed into court in
blatant disregard for the Rules of Civil Procedure, Statute of Limitation, Federal
Bankruptcy Laws.

But this is a starting point to correct the wrongs done here.

So should an appellant be sanctioned for trying to get the court to answer
the following questions?

1.

If a judge does not have jurisdiction unless a complaint has been filed in a

timely matter. Why does only the defendant the only one to have standing to
address the statute of limitation?

If this is true, anybody can file a lawsuit

anytime in the future after the statute of limitation if the defendant is not found.
2.

If a party cannot be found after the statute of limitation, a person can

publish in the last known area newspaper, in the last known address where they
have not live in for years.

3.

Can bankruptcy protected property be sold to pay an attorney fees?

Appellant found he cannot file issues dealing with the courts in federal court,
having it dismissed without prejudice and has legal assistance (counsel) willing to
help when this is addressed it this court to why bankruptcy protected property is
being ignored in this case.

4.

Should res judicata apply to other issues of pei:jury, forgery and fraud,

when the court only concluded in a Summary Judgment that appellant gave 50%
of the property to ex-wife?
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5.

If the courts only issue under Summary Judgment was "That ruling

essentially precluded Matthews from relitigating any of the same issues, or any issues
that could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action. The ruling in the 2009
lien foreclosure case bars consideration of the issues which were raised or which
could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action." And this is the crux of
the respondents' case. Then the other issues of perjury, forgery and fraud go back to
their initial argument of admissions that Sallaz did circumvent federal bankruptcy
laws, state statutes, commit perjury, fraud, and forgery in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on
December 30th, 2014.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 1

(I)
The district court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the
Respondents on the basis of res judicata. (Same argument as Appellant's Argument # 1)

Judge Owen dismissed this case under a Memorandum Decision and Order RE:
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment after a Pre-trial Conference was to be
held.

And concluded CR 128-129 that "The ownership interests in the Nampa home

were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself and
Jacqueline. Each became a 50% owner. The divorce court determined that the Nampa
home was community property. That.finding has never been appealed In connection with
the divorce, Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount o/$3,400. When the assignee
of the attorney's claim and lien filed to foreclose that lien, the lien amount was alleged to
have grown by a factor of about 10, to more than $32,000. Due to Jacqueline's default, the
attorney'.~ assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50% interest for a credit bid <~fa
fraction of the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's 50% interest in the Nampa
home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lien foreclosure action. Neither
Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any action qffecting
Matthews' 50% interest. The lienfhreclosure court ruled that Matthews lacked standing to
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assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded Matthews from
litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in the 2009
action. The ruling in the 2009 lien ji:Jreclosure case bars consideration of the
issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action.
a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counse/f<Jr defendants is directed to submit an
appropriatefhrm ofjudgment within ten (10) days <~f the entry c~fthis decision."

The respondents apply res judicata to the issues NEVER addressed of admitted
fraud, perjury and forgery. But more interesting is the court judge did not dismiss the
case from any motion filed by respondents.

Nowhere in the judge's Memorandum

dismissing this case does he apply res judicata to issues that have since found that the
respondents committed perjury saying payments were caught up and current, forgery
when they forged documents to cause the sale and dismissing the case in Canyon County
and fraud on the court when they submitted false documents showing payments were
caught up, causing the foreclosure of the Nampa property. And nowhere in the motion
for summary judgment did it mention anything about who was responsible for the
payments on the Nampa property. More importantly, besides not having any reference to
the above, there are no documents submitted by the respondent in their short Answer, or
their admission in the Motion and Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment. Nor did
the court in the Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment did the court even mention that appellant was responsible for the
payments. But more importantly dismissing the case as 'untimely' without addressing
this was really strange, besides the court not producing the Second Motion to Reconsider
and the court not making any reference to the Second Motion to Reconsider in denying
the motion without a hearing, again the judge as at hearing, in appellant's Second Motion
to Reconsider and again in the one sentence saying Memorandum Decision and Order
RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment denial as 'untimely.'

Then

denying this Motion saying "it appearing that the motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 59
(e), and is not permitted as a post-judgment motion for reconsideration under LR.C.P. 11
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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(a)(2)(B) of an order made by the Court under either Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and
the Court being fully informed"

RESPONDENT'S ARGUfvfENT 2

(2)
Did the appellant raise all issues on appeal that has challenged the decision
of the court in granting Summary Judgment?
Since the only issue addressed in the Courts' Memorandum dismissing the case
dealt with only the Canyon County case and ownership of the property between parties,
appellant argued all issues in his two Motions to Reconsider were filed addressing
appellant's Summary Judgment issues and Surprise ruling by the court. The first, the
court did not address any issues CR 159 saying that "the claims that Judge McKee could
not address where never addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was
filed that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling in Judge
McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false doctunents, and fraud. And
the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent of the property then allowed the
defendants to attach their lien to the whole property again does not fall under res judicata.
Finally this court addresses Final Judgment. This court uses the divorce as the final
judgment to justify the defendants to justify the defendants circumventing the statutes and
rules of civil procedure of Idaho."

presented by the appellant on his Motion to

Reconsider and oral argument, where the court made a surprise ruling on appellant was
responsible for the payments. The second attempt was a Second Motion to Reconsider to
address issues of responsibility of the payments was submitted by the appellant one day
after the hearing, but dismissed as untimely, So besides already argued in briefs the
surprise ruling was made by this court.

Saying that plaintiff was responsible to ensure

the payments were to be made, even without possession or able to collect the rents that
co-owners were allowed to collect and have possession of the property. Nor giving
appellant an opportunity to address this, and attempted to bring this out in a timely
Second Motion to Reconsider, to have it dismissed as untimely. The respondents apply
Af>PELLANT'S TYPE-WRJTTEN REPLY
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res judicata to the issues of admitted fraud, perjury and forgery. But more interesting is
court judge did not dismiss the case from any motion filed by respondents. He
this case under a Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second
for Summary Judgment. And concluded "The mvnership interests in the Nampa
home were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself and
Jacqueline. Each became a 50% o~ner. The divorce court determined that the Nampa
home was community property. That finding has never been appealed. In connection with
the divorce, Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount of $3,400. When the assignee
of the attorney's claim and lien filed to foreclose that lien, the lien amount was alleged to
grown by a factor of about I 0, to more than $32,000. Due to Jacqueline's default, the
attorney's assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50% interest for a credit bid of a
fraction of the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's 50% interest in the Nampa
home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lien foreclosure action. Neither
Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any action affecting
Matthews' 50% interest. The lien foreclosure court ruled that Matthews lacked standing to
assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded Matthews from
litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in the 2009 lien
foreclosure action. The ruling in the 2009 lien foreclosure case bars consideration of the
issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action.
As

a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counsel for defendants is directed to submit an

appropriate form of judgment within ten ( l 0) days of the entry of this decision."
Nowhere in the judge's Memorandum dismissing this case does he apply res
judicata to issues that have since found that the respondents committed perjury saying
payments were caught up and current, forgery when they forged documents to cause the
sale and dismissing the case in Canyon County and fraud on the court when they
submitted false documents showing payments were caught up, causing the foreclosure of
the Nampa property. And nowhere in the motion for summary judgment did it mention
anything about who was responsible for the payments on the Nampa property. More
importantly, besides not having any reference to the above, there are no documents
submitted by the respondent in their short Answer, or their admission in the Motion and
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN
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Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment. Nor did the court in the Memorandum
Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment did the court
even mention that appellant was responsible for the payments. But more importantly
dismissing the case as 'untimely' without addressing this was really strange, besides the
court not producing the Second Motion to Reconsider and the court not making any
reference to the Second Motion to Reconsider in denying the motion without a hearing,
the judge as at hearing, in appellant's Second Motion to Reconsider and again in

the one sentence saying

Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second

Motion for Summary Judgment denial as 'untimely.' Then denying this Motion saying
"it appearing that the motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 59 (e), and is not permitted as a
post-judgment motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) of an order made by
the Court under either Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and therefore the Court being fully
informed"

So if the Judgment is filed on March 13, 2015 and the first Motion to

Reconsider was filed on March 19, 2015. That is six (6) days. And order denying
Motion to Reconsider was made on April 27, 2015 and the Second Motion to Reconsider
was filed on April 27. 2015 on the surprise ruling appellant was not allowed to address at
court. That is only one ( 1) day? So if the Judgment is filed on March 13, 2015 and the
Motion to Reconsider was filed on March 19, 2015. That is six (6) days. And order
denying Motion to Reconsider was made on April 27, 2015 and the Second Motion to
Reconsider wa'> filed on April 27, 2015 on the surprise ruling appellant was not allowed
to address at court. That is only one ( 1) day?

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 2
(2)
Did the district court erroneously rule that the court only attached to
appellant's portion of the property?
The Respondents say that they did not attach any portion of the appellant's
property in the sale of the property, and then admit that "National Financial" now the
second lien holder on the property would be paid fully before funds would be distributed
between appellant and respondents. As argued in the initial Appellant's Brief (argument
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY BRIEFS
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2, page 25) 'The judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be held with
proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA, then to pay off the

second lien by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally between
Defendant Matthews and National.?'

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 3
(3) Can real property be sold to satisfy an attorneys' lien?

Common law recognizes two types of attorney liens to secure payment of attorney fees.
The first type of attorney lien is called the general, retaining, or possessory lien (the "retaining
lien").1 The retaining lien "of an attorney is his right to retain possession of all documents,

money, or other property of his client coming into his hands professionally until a general
balance due him for professional services is paid.''s An attorney could not apparently use a
retaining lien to obtain a security interest in a client's real property. The second type of attorney
lien is called the special, particular, or charging lien (the "charging lien"). The charging lien "of
an attorney is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to him for services in a suit
secured to him 0ut of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.... Logically, an attorney
could use a charging lien to acquire a security interest in a client's real property, where the
attorney's services obtain title to, or possession of, such property for the client.
A lawyer may bring a collection lawsuit against a former client and obtain a money
judgment for the unpaid legal billings. However, possession of a money judgment does not
automatically give rise to a lien against the judgment debtor's real property. Instead, the
judgment creditor is first required to satisfy the judgment through execution against the
judgment debtor's personal property. If such personal property is insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, then the judgment creditor may seek execution against the judgment debtor's real
property.
Executions against realty shall command the officer to whom they are directed to make
execution against the realty of the judgment debtor only after execution has been made against
the personal property of the judgment debtor that is in the county, and such personal property is
insufficient to meet the sum of money and costs for which judgment was rendered."
U.S. district court in Rubel v Brimacombe & Schlecte, PC. 86 BR 81 (ED Mich 1988) There,
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plaintiff initially retained defendant law firm to represent her in a divorce action. Plaintiff discharged
defendant while the action was still pending, retaining substitute counsel. In the stipulation and order of
substitution, defendant inserted a provision granting itself a lien against trial or settlement proceeds to
secure

of its fees, unbeknownst to plaintiff. Under the judgment of divorce, plaintiff was awarded

the marital home. Defendant, not having received full payment from plaintiff, recorded a "notice of claim
of interest" against the marital home with the register of deeds. In plaintiff's Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding, she sought to discharge defendant's lien, alleging it was a dischargeable judicial lien under the
Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court, applying Michigan law, ruled that defendant had an attorney's
charging lien, which was based in common law and was therefore non-dischargeable. An attorney's
charging lien for fees could not attach to the client's real property. The district court noted that
Michigan case law had not yet addressed the issue: "The courts of Michigan have not ruled
directly on the issue of whether an attorney's charging lien may attach to real property."19 The
court then concluded that Michigan courts would adhere to the rule followed by a majority of
other states: "[I] conclude that in Michigan courts would follow the majority rule disallowing
attorney's liens on real property unless there is an express contract between the parties or
special equitable circumstances exist." Applying that rule to the case at hand, the district court
held that defendant did not have a valid lien against the marital home and reversed the
bankruptcy court's ruling.

The Court of Appeals framed the issue on appeal as "whether

an attorneys' lien can attach to a client's real property."26 Initially, the court identified the
retaining lien and the charging lien as the types of attorney liens recognized by Michigan law,
and described the general nature of each type of lien.21 Regarding the charging lien, the court
noted that it attaches to "a judgment, settlement, or other money recovered as a result of the
attorney's services," and that "[c]ase law acts as the sole guide with regard to these liens."zsThe
court specifically found that the defendant's asserted lien was a charging lien: "In this case,
defendant is asserting the right to a charging lien." So the precise issue before the court was
actually whether an attorney's charging lien can attach to a client's real property. The Court of
Appeals then described the process by which a creditor may obtain and execute a judgment
against a debtor, including a debtor's real property.

Regarding the attachment of a charging

lien, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "these liens automatically attach to funds or a
money judgment recovered through the attorney's services,"
The Court of Appeals states, "disallowing attorney liens upon real property owned by
clients unless there is an express written contract between the parties providing for such a lien or
unless special equitable circumstances existed."
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Combining the majority rule in other states of an attorney's charging lien against a client's real

attorney's charging lien for foes may not be imposed upon the real estate

a

even if the attorney has successfully prosecuted a suit to establish a client's title or
recover title or possession for the client, unless:
( 1) the parties have an express agreement providing for a lien,
(2) the attorney obtains a judgment for the fees and follows the proper procedure for
enforcing a judgment, or
(3) special equitable circumstances exist to warrant imposition of a lien.

The "express agreement" must specifically provide for a lien on real property .. that "AT-

TORNEYS shall have general, possessory or retaining CLIENT'S liens, and all special or
charging liens known to law[.]" When the client did not pay the attorney's invoices, the attorney
recorded a lien against the client's real property, which had been awarded to the client under the
judgment of divorce. (Because the real property was obtained as the result of the attorney's
services, it was plausible for the attorney to assert an attorney's charging lien against such
property.)
"In the absence of a written contract, an equitable lien will be established only where,
the relations of the parties, there is a clear intent to use an identifiable piece of property
as security for a debt." A lawyer may assert an equitable lien against a client's real property,
based on an agreement with the client that such real property would serve as security for payment
of the attorney's fees.
fn 1989, the State Bar of Michigan Professional Ethics Committee considered whether it
was ethical for a lawyer to acquire an interest in the client's non-litigated real property, in
Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-40. The committee opined that a lawyer may take a mortgage
against the client's real property in order to secure payment of anticipated legal fees, provided
that the real property is not the subject matter of litigation in which the lawyer represents the
client, and provided that the requirements of MRPC l .8(a) are satisfied. "A lawyer may obtain a
mortgage on a client's property provided the lawyer complies with MRPC l.8(a), and the
prop4~rty which the mortgage secures is not the subject matter of litigation the lawyer is
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conducting for the clientf .]''61 "If the interest charged is usurious, the terms of the transaction are
nol fair

reasonable to the client and violate MRPC l.8(a)(1).
In Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-354, the lawyer was representing a client in a contested

divorce case. The marital estate consisted of one asset: the equity in the marital home. The
husband and wife owned the marital home as tenants by the entireties. The lawyer desired to take
a lien against the marital home in order to secure payment of legal fees. The lawyer anticipated
that his client would receive, under the judgment of divorce, and as the result of the la\\>yer' s

services, either sole or joint interest in the marital home.
The lawyer proposed a two-step transaction. First, the client would execute a warranty
deed conveying the client's interest in the marital home to the lawyer. Second, upon entry of the
judgment of divorce, the lawyer would re-convey title to the marital home to the client, in
exchange for the client's execution of a promissory note and mortgage against the home.
The committee initially noted that the proposed lien would have to satisfy the three
requirements of MRPC 1.8(a) (i.e., fair and reasonable terms; opportunity to consult independent
counsel; and client's written consent). The committee then referenced MI Eth Op RI-40 (1989),
which had opined that a lawyer may take a mortgage against the client's non-litigated real
property in order to secure payment of anticipated legal fees.

APPELLANT ARGUMENT 4

(4)
Did Respondent Sallaz circumvent the Federal Bankruptcy Laws?
(Including attaching appellant's portion of bankruptcy protected property).

In a Memorandum of Decision filed on April 15, 2004, where appellant objected
to the allowance of two proofs of claims by Dennis Sallaz and former spouse. Sallaz has

also filed a motion to revoke Chapter 13 plan by fraud ... Sallaz said appellant owed him
$10,632.68 for legal services provided to Ms Mitchell and spouse alleged appellant owed
ex-wife $109,000. That fraud was based on valuation of the 4 parcels of property ... and
because the bankruptcy estate does not include her interest in any former community
property, Debtor owes Ms. Mitchell nothing ... That Ms. Mitchell obviously overstated
her claim against appellant and the bankruptcy estate ... that Ms Mitchell would be
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN REPLY BRIEFS

24

to $18,000 from property sale proceeds ... the state court divorce decree granted
no

against the debtor's property ... for purposes of this bankruptcy case, Ms.

Mitchell's claim is unsecured ... Appellant objects to Mr. Sallaz' proof of claim because,
he says, he owes M. Sallaz nothing. . . divorce decree provided that each party is
responsible for the payment of his or her own attoney fees. Appellant also suggest that
because his bankiuptcy estate includes only bis undivided one-half interest in the real
property, Mr. Sallaz holds no lien on any property of the bankruptcy estate ... Debtor is
not indebted to Mr. Sallaz ... when the state court entered its decree of divorce, appellant
and Ms. Mitchell ceased to own any community property... Mr. Sallaz has no basis to
assert a claim against appellant's bankruptcy estate... (page 13) ... Furthermore, the
legitimacy of Mr. Sallaz's liens is doubtful, even were there any property of the
bankruptcy estate to which those liens could attach. In Idaho, an attorney is limited by
the types of liens that may be asserted against a client's property. Permissible liens
include either "possessory" or "charging" liens. See Dearborn Constr. Inc 03.11.B.C.R.
17, 19 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (citing Frazee v Frazee, 660 P2d 928 (Idaho 1983).
Because Mr. Sallaz's liens are not asserted against any "documents, money or other
property obtained in his professional capacity,: Frazee, at 929, he likely can not assert a
possessory lien against the real estate. And because a charging lien merely allows an
attorney to assert an interest in a client's cause of action, and in any judgment or money
award procured by attorney's services, Idaho Code § 3-205, Mr. Sallaz' s liens on
Debtor's real property would not likely be within his reach. See In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8,
13-14 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000)(Denying attorney's claim of a charging lien in monies held
by the trustee because there was no "fund" created by the attorney's services). Moreover,
"[t]he plain language of [Idaho Code § 3-205] allows a lien in favor of a lawyer solely
against the lawyer's client, not against the adverse party to the litigation." Elsaesser v
Raeon (In re Goldberg), 235 B.R. 476, 484-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho l 999)(Citing Frazee, 660
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P2d at 930). Given the facts here, Mr. Sallaz has not shown he has holds a valid lien on
nr,n,P•rn,

of the Debtor or bankruptcy estate to secure payment of his fees ... "

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 5

(5)
Are jurists and attorneys sti11 bound by the Idaho Codes, rules of civil
procedure and statutes even if a oartv does not or unable to resoond to a comolaint?

.._

..L

I.

"'

I.

Where does res judicata apply if these issues in third district court were
supposively none of the appellant's business.

Just for the record appellant wants this

court to just answer the question. Even if the main defendant in the case did not respond
to the complaint (and listed also of a defendant in this complaint, he was required to file
an ANSWER to this complaint, where appellant was required to answer the complaint.
So in essence listed as a defendant, the appellant can and should have been able to
respond to the complaint as a whole. If a complaint was filed against the appellant listed
as a defendant, then the appellant had the right to challenge the validity of the complaint
filed also against him. And question if a judge can take jurisdiction of any case that has
surpassed the statute oflimitation (especially when the appellant is listed as a defendant)?
Has this ever happened?

If a defendant fails to respond to a complaint-summons, then

plaintiffs can circumvent the rules of civil procedure? Don't have to give an accounting
and make up a figure?
So in essence this can set a precedent for even the appellant to file a lawsuit several
years past the statute of limitation, publish last known address several years earlier, not have
to give an accounting and the courts will not question statute of limitation, accounting or any
rules of civil procedure if the defendant does not respond to your complaint.

This is so the

appellant is not giving bad advise and can use this case to show that plaintiff's filing lawsuits
from someone owing monies several years ago past the statute of limitation can still file a
lawsuit, name an amount and foreclose on personal or real property? And if denied, use this
case as a recent decision to set a precedent in an appeal using this courts· or the district
courts' ruling to allow this to use a new ruling that unless the defendant disputes a rule of
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law: statute of limitation, accounting, service or any other procedure, a plaintiff can
circumvent state rules and statutes?
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 6
(6)
Does res judicata apply to perjury to the court when respondents testified
that the payments were current and had caught up the payments, produced false
documentation that the payments were caught up (cashier check) and current (ledger)?
(Especially when the court did not dismiss the case addressing any of these issues under
res judicata).
Since Judge Owen did not even reference the issues that brought about the present
lawsuit dismissing this case dealing of the split of the property and issues dealing with
the Third Judicial District Court rulings not appealable (even through appellant tried).
Res Judicata applies where the issues have the same parties which does apply here. Same
claims which does not apply here, since the claims for the most part here came about
after the Ada County case was settled where the appellant got back 50% share of the
Nampa property, but would not get a share of the profits because the respondents had
caught up their back payments and taxes in the arrears and had kept them current.

To

find they made no payments, did not catch up the arrears, saying they were not able to
assume the loan on the property. Which is not an issue, since they could apply the
payments to the loan on the property. And if appellant was responsible for and made the
payments then the court would obviously given appellant control of the property or it
would have been an issue in another claim.
The case should have never been dismissed. The court could have ruled that only
he issues dealing with what transpired since the previous court ruling on fraud and
per:jury to that court. Then the appellant could only use other issues as laying foundation
that lead to the perjury, fraud and forgery to the court. But to dismiss the case only on
the issue of ownership of the property in question and issues leading to the sale of the
property and not address the other issues that took place in the previous court and
admissions by the respondents.
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APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 7

Was appellant responsible for payments or paying off Idaho Housing
the Nampa property was sold at sheriff's sale (especially when the court orders that
respondents were respondents were responsible to payoff Idaho Housing).
The Third District Court Judge in his Judgement said . . . that appellant was
responsible for payments made to Idaho Housing and that Ms Mitchell was not on the
loan on the property and that since appellant quit claimed half the property to her, then
she was nor are the respondents responsible for the payments.

Except between

September 2010 and 2013 the appellant did not have or own the property, as the
respondent stated in his briefs. It was sold at Sheriff's sale in 2010. The order by the
court as in argument # 1 was 'The judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be

held with proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA ... " How
can the appellant be responsible for payments on property illegally taken away
from him? Was the appellant suppose to make payments on the property he had
no possession of or collected rents from? This is what the court was saying with
the bombshell, first time ever brought to the attention of either party (unless there
were some ex parte communication), since the appellant could not address this
to the court when the court made this determination.

CONCLUSION
The Federal Bankruptcy Laws protect property su~ject to federal bankruptcy
protection, and the respondents attached appellant's share of the property to sell
bankruptcy protected property even without filing beyond the statute of limitation, and
committed fraud on the court when it sold that property under another attorney's name,
and dismissed the case so it could not be appealed from third district court,

Then

appellant to be awarded half the prope1iy, but not given control because the respondents
had caught up the payments they fell behind (showing a ledger and cashier check) and
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testifying that they had applied the cashier check to catch up payments and a ledger to
that payments were current. And then to have this court inform appellant since
""'"'L-,HJlf",

that res j udicata did not apply to dismiss this case saying appellant was
for the payments no matter how they got the property, lied about catching

making payments and circumvented botµ this state and federal bankruptcy laws and
to stop the appellant from appealing this 6ase by awarding exorbitant attorney fees 71
days after judgment. Then when attempts were made to show appellant attempted to
show he was not responsible for the payments when he did not own the property, the
court dismisses the Second Motion to Reconsider as untimely.

That the appellant

requests this court to remand this to court for a jury trial with instructions on at least the
issues of what transpired after the last court awarding half the property and denied
proceeds giving the false accounting by the respondents and award costs. This court
should determine that issues dealing with the falsifying documents, perjury and fraud
committed during the court trial giving back half ownership of the property that led to
this lawsuit.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this
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U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of Idaho
Filed: April 15, 2004
At 2 00 p.m.
By SylV1a Wi1th~

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

In Re:
TERRENCE JAMES
MATTHEWS,

Bankruptcy Ca.se
No. 03-00998

Debtor.

MEMORANDlJM OF DECISION

Appearances:
David L. Posey, Payette, Idaho, Attorney for Debtor.

Kelly I. Beeman, Boise, Idaho, Attorney for Creditors Dennis Sallaz
and Jacqueline Mitchell.
John Kromrnenhoek, Boise, Idaho, Chapter 13 Trustee.

Chapter 13 Debtor Terrence Matthews has objected to the allowance

of two proofs of claim, one filed by attorney Dennis Sallaz, and the other filed by
Debtor's former spouse, Jacqueline Mitchell. Mr. Sallaz has also filed a motion to
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 1
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confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 plan because, he says, it was

procured by fraud. The Court conducted a consolidated evidentiary hearing
concerning these matters on March 16, 2003. After due consideration of the
evidence and arguments presented by the parties, together with the applicable law,
the Comi enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 7052; 9014.
Background and Facts
From the record, the following facts appear undisputed and are, for
convenience, presented below in two components. The first section deals with the
procedural developments

i11

Debtor's bankruptcy case, with a focus upon the

notice provided to Mr. Sallaz and Ms. Mitchell. The second section deals with
Debtor's valuation of certain real estate, which is the central issue in Mr. Sallaz' s
motion to revoke the confirmation order.

A. Debtor's Chapter 13 case.
Debtor and Ms. Mitchell were divorced in a state court action in
which Mr. Sallaz represented Ms. Mitchell. Thereafter, Debtor filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankrnptcy Code on March 24, 2003. Docket No.
1. The master mailing list of creditors submitted by Debtor at that time, see
L.B.R. 1007.1, did not list Ms. Mitchell. It did, however, contain Tv1r. SaHa7.'s
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name and proper mailing address. Debtor's original Schedule D lists Ms.
as a secured creditor and lists Mr. Sallaz as an "(a]ssignee or other notification for

[Ms.] Mitchell." Docket No. L Debtor's Amended Schedule D, filed on May 14,
2003, omitted any mention of either Ms. Mitchell or Mr. Sallaz. Docket No. l 0.
The Conrt's records show that on March 27, 2003, Mr. Sallaz was
mailed a notice that Debtor had commenced a case under Chapter 13 of the

Banlrn1ptcy Code, that a§ 34 l(a) 1 creditors' meeting would be held on April 25,

2003, and that a confirmation hearing concerning Debtor's proposed plan, a copy

of which was enclosed with the notice, would be held on May 27, 2003. On April
2, 2003, Mr. Sallaz was sent a notice that the coufimmtion hearing had been
rescheduled for June to, 2003. Docket No. 7. Apparently, Ms. Mitchell did not
directly receive notice of any of these events or dates and it is unclear if Mr. Sallaz
relayed any of the information in the notices he received to his client, Ms.

Mitchell.
Neither Ms. Mitchell nor Mr. Sallaz objected to confirmation of
Debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan. But just prior to the June IO confirmation
hearing, the Chapter 13 trustee, Mr. Krommenhoek, filed a written
recommendation opposing confinnation. Docket No. 13. From the Court's

All statuto1y references are to title 11 of'the Unite<l States Code unless
otherwise noted.
1
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it appears that the on 1y party voicing any concerns about confirmation of
Debtor's plan was the trustee. The Court continued the confirmation hearing until

July 8, 2003. However, the Court inforn1ed il1ose in attendance that if the trustee's
concerns were resolved, he could so indicate by subrnitting an order confirming

!!
Debtor's plan bearing his signature approval, and the Court would enter the order
and vacate the continued confmnati011 hearing. Minute Entry, Docket No. 14. lt
appears that the trustee approved a confirrnatjon order on July 8; this order was
submitted to and entered by the Court on July 9. Docket No. 17. Thus, a second
confim1ation hearing was not held.
Mr. Sallaz filed two proofs of claim on July 24, 2003, after the Court
had already confumed Debtor's plan. Mr. Sallaz filed the first proof of claim on
his own behalf, alleging Debtor owed him $10,632.68 for legal services provided
to Ms. Mitchell. Proof of Claim No. 17. Mr. Sallaz filed the second proof of
claim on behalf of Ms. Mitchell. In it, she alleges that Debtor owes her $109,000
based upon the parties' divorce decree. Proof of Claim No. 18.
Debtor objected to both proofa of claim on August 6, 2003. Docket
Nos. 18, 19. Later, on February 9, 2004, Mr. Sallaz filed a motion requesting that

the Court revoke the order confll1lling Debtor's Chapter 13 plan because,
according to Mr. Sallaz, it had been obtained by fraud. Docket No. 29. More
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specifically, Mr. Sallaz suggests that the value Debtor had placed 011 four

of real property was fraudulent.
B. Debtor's valuation of real property.
In the "Judgment and Decree of Divorce," entered in the divorce
action on November 26, 2002, the state court identified the parties' community
debts and community property. Proof of Cla:it:n No. 18, Attach. The divorce court
ordered that the community real property be sold; that the community debts be
paid from the proceeds; and that from any remaining proceeds, Ms. Mitchell be
paid $18,000 as a reimbursement for her separate property contributions to the
marriage, with any excess to be shared by the parties. Id. The state court also
decreed that "[e]ach party shall be responsible for their attorney fees incurred
herein, and said fees shall not be paid before the division of the community
property as debts of the community." Proof of Claim No. 18, Attach. at 4--5.

The state court made specific findings regarding four parcels ofreal
property. Three parcels of property were identified as community property. Proof
of Claim No. 18, Attach. at 2. These three community property parcels were

valued as follows:
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Property Location

I

II

1911

2nd

St. South, Nampa, lD

r0

I

04~:J.8)4
L~

Market Value

Encumbrances

$72,000

$48,000
$20,000

I

114 S. Boise Avenue, Emmett, ID

$60,000

I

Clear Creek Prop., Boise Co., ID

$25,000

·-·~-·

$0

The fourth parcel, located at 819 S. Conunercial, Emmett, Idaho, which was
Debtor's separate property, was not valued by the state court, although Gem
County had assessed its value at $60,370 for property tax purposes. Id. at 2-3;
Aff. of Sallaz at 2, Docket No. 30.
During the pendency of the divorce case, Mr. Sa11az filed notices of
liens on the three properties located in Nampa, in Boise County, and at 114 S.
Boise Ave, Emmett. Proof of Claim No. 17, Attachs. 1-3. These notices, all filed
on July 18, 2002, advised that Mr. Sallaz claimed an attorney's lien on the
property to secure payment of the fees he earned while representing Ms. Mitchell
in the divorce action.
Debtor's initial bankruptcy schedules listed the following
infommtion concerning his real property:
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Property Location

Market Value

Encumbrances

1911 2"d St. S0utl1, Nampa, ID

(1/2 interest) $30,000

$69,768.72

114 S. Boise Ave., Emmett, JD

(Y2 interest ) $20,000

$40,557.64

j Clear Creek Prop., Boise Co., ID

(Vi interest) $20,000

$39,578.95

$35,000

$29,183.64

819 S. Commercial, Emmett, ID

See Schedule A, Docket No. 1.
On May 14, 2003, Debtor amended the values in his schedules as
follows:

Property Location

Market Value

Encumbrances

1911 2"d St. South, Nampa, TD

(V2 interest) $30,000

$54,658.84

114 S. Bo.ise Avenue, Emmett, ID

(Yz interest) $10,000

$22,449.62

Clear Creek Prop., Boise Co., ID

(V:. interest) $10,000

$22,332.96

819 S. Commercial, Emmett, ID

$35,000

$29,767.64

See Am. Schedule A, Docket No. 10.
Discussion and Disposition
A. Debtor's objection to Ms. Mitchell's proof of claim.

Debtor urges two grounds for disallowance of Ms. Mitchell's proof
of claim. 2 First, Debtor argues that the amount claimed due by Ms. Mitchell is

2

Debtor's written objection to Ms. Mitchell's proof of daim, Docket No. 19, also
alleges that Ms. Mitchell's claim was untimely filed. Debtor's counsel withdrew that
argument at the hearing.
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premised on the values placed on the real property in the parties' divorce decree,
and that because the bankruptcy estate does not include her interest in any fonner
community property, Debtor owes Ms. Mitchell nothing. Secondly, Debtor argues
that because he has appealed the divorce judgment, it is not final, and Ms.
Mitchell's claim should not be allowed.
The Conrt agrees in part with Debtor's analysis. Ms. Mitchell has
obviously overstated her claim against Debtor and the bankruptcy estate:' Debtor
docs not "owe" Ms. Mitchell any sums for her interest in the real property.
Under the state court's decree of divorce, the parties' community
ownership interest in the three parcels of real property was effectively terminated.
Instead, under the decree, the parties became tenants in common as to these
parcels until the property could be sold and the proceeds divided. See Idaho Code
§ 32-712 (requiring courts to assign community property to the respective parties);

Batra v. Batra, 17 P.3d 889,895 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (noting Idaho Codes 32712 reflects a policy of separating the parties' interests in property, giving each
immediate control over their interests in community property); McNett v. McNett,
501 P.2<l 1059, 1061 (Idaho 1960) (criticizing a trial court's decision to award real

The applicable law regarding the shifting burdens of proof in claims litigation
was clearly explained in Tn re Fahos, 03.1 l.B.C.R. 60, 61 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). There
is no need to repeat that discussion here.
3
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to fonner married persons as tenants in common because such ownership
requires an ongoing relationship inconsistent with the goal of a divorce decree).
\Vhile all community property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate when one
spouse files a petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2), the same is not trne of the co-

owned property of fonner spouses. Under these facts, Ms. Mitchell's one-half
interest as a tenant in common in the co-owned real property did not become
property of Debtor's bankruptcy estate; her interest in the real estate remains intact
and unimpaired. Therefore, she docs not hold a valid "claim" against Debtor's

bankruptcy estate that would in any way allow her to participate in distributions

under Debtor's confirmed plan. Therefore, the amount stated in Ms. Mitchell's
proof of claim attributable to her estimate of the value of the real property doeg not
represent a debt, and must be disallowed.
However, Ms. Mitchell's entitlement under the decree to an $18,000
"reimbursement" from Debtor as a result of the state court's division of the parties'
debts and property does constitute an allowable claim. Section JOl(lO)(A) of the
Code defines "creditor" as including an ''entity that has a claim against the debtor

.... " 11 U .S .C. § 101(10). ln turn, "claim" is defined as a "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
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u.s.c. § 101

Because tl1e state court effectively

that Ms. Mitchell could recover the $18,000 "reimbursement" from property sale
proceeds in which Debtor would otherwise be entitled to share, she has a
cognizable "right to payment" for that amom1t.
Ms. Mitchell offered no evidence that she holds a lien or other
security interest in Debtor's interest in the real property to secure payment of this
reimbursement claim. Notably, the state court divorce decree grants Ms. Mitchell
no lien against Debtor's property to :=;ecure her right to payment. Therefore, for
purposes of this bankruptcy case, Ms. Mitchell's claim is unsecured.

The Court disagrees with Debtor's contention that the pendency of
appeal of the state court divorce decree constitutes a basis to disallow her claim.
As explained above, the Bankruptcy Code defines the tenn "claim" quite broadly
and includes rights to payment that are disputed. 11 U.S.C. ~ 101(5). In Audre,

Inc. v. Casey (In re Audre, Inc.), 216 B.R. 19, 32-33 (B.A.P. 9 111 Cir. 1997), the
Panel affomed the bankrnptcy court's decision not to estimate a claim based on a
state family court judgment that was on appeal, but instead to allow the claim as
filed. Although much of the Audre decision deals with the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, the case does support the proposition that, for bankruptcy purposes, a
claim based on a state court judgment subject to appeal is valid until such time as
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state appellate court reverses. id.; see aiso In re Afitchell, 255 B.R. 345,
358--61 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (explaining that a claim arising from a California
family court judgment being appealed must be considered for Chapter t 3

11

eligibility purposes); In re Keenan, 201 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996)

(rejecting the argument that a claim arising from a staie court judgment on appeal

I

was subject to estimation by the bankruptcy court). Therefore, the fact that Debtor
has appealed the state court's decree of divorce docs not, by itself, supply a reason

I

to disallow Ms. Mitchell's claim.
Because Debtor has successfully rebutted the prima facie validity of
:Vls. Mitchell's claim, the Court will sustain Debtor's objectjon in part. Ms.
Mitchell's claim will be allowed as an unsecured claim for $18,000, and she is
entitled to share in distributions to unsecured creditors under Debtor's confinned
Chapter 13 plan to that extent. The balance of her claim will be disallowed.

B. Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim.
Debtor objects to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim because, he says, he
owes Mr. Sallaz nothing. 4 See Docket No. 18. To support this position, Debtor
points to the language in the divorce decree quoted above providing that each party

Dehtor's written objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim, Docket No. 18, also
alleges that Mr. Sallaz's claim was late filed. Debtor's counsel withdrew that argument at
the;: hearing.
4
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is responsible for the payment of bis or her own attorney fees. Debtor also
suggests that because bis bankruptcy estate includes only Debtor's undivided onebalf interest in the real property, Mr. Sallaz holds no Jien on any property of the
bankruptcy estate.
Clearly, the state court did not order Debtor to pay Ms. Mitchell's
attorney's foes owed to Mr. Sallaz. In this sense, then, Debtor is not indebted to
Mr. Sallaz. However, the Code definition of "creditor" also includes an "entity
that has a community claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101( lO)(C). A "community claim" is
one "that arose [prepetition] concerning the debtor for which property of the kind
specified in section§ 54I(a)(2) of this title is liable, whether or not there is any
such property at the time of the commencement of the case.'' l l U.S.C. § 101(7).
Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2) includes community property, as defined by
applicable state law, in the bankruptcy estate.
Again, as discussed above, when the state court entered its decree of
divorce, Debtor and Ms. Mitchell ceased to mvn any community property.
AfcNett, 50 l P.2d at 106 L In light of the language in the divorce decree making

each party responsible only for his or her own legal fees, and the transformation

that occurred upon the parties' divorce of community property into separate (albdt
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sorne cases co-owned) property, Mr. SaJiaz bas no basis to assert a claim
Debtor's bankruptcy estate.
Fnrthennore, the legitimacy of Mr. Sallaz's liens is doubtful, even
were there any property of the bankruptcy estate to which those liens could attach.
Tu Idaho, an attomey is limited 1n the types of liens that may be asserted against a

client's property. Pennissib1e liens include either "possessory" or "charging"
liens. See in re Dearborn Constr-, inc., 03.1 I.B.C.R. l7, 19 (Ban.kr. D. Idalw

2002) (citing Frazee v. Frazee, 660 P.2d 928 (I<laho 1983)). Because Mr. Sallaz's
liens are not asserted against any "documents, money or other property obtained in
his professional capacity," Frazee, 660 P .2d at 929, he likely can not assert a
possessory lieu against the real estate. And because a charging lien merely allows
an attorney to assert an interest in a client's cause of action, and in any judgment
or money award procured by the attorney's services, Idaho Code§ 3~205,-1 Mr.
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or
implied, of the pmties, which is not restrained by law. From
the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer
containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision
or judgment in his ciient's favor and the proceeds thereof 1n
whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected
by any settlement between the parties before or after

j udgrnent.
Idaho Code§ 3-205.
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Sallaz's liens on Debtor' s real property would not hkely be within his reach.

See

In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 13-14 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (denying attorney' s claim
of a charging lien in monies held by the trustee because there was no "fund"

11

created by the attorney's services). Moreover, "[t]hc plain language of [Idaho
Code § 3-205] a1lows a lien in favor of a lawyer solely against the lawyer's client,

not against the adverse party to the litigation." Elsaesser v. Raeon (In re

Goldberg), 235 B.R. 476, 484-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (citing Frazee, 660 P.2d
at 930). Given the facts here, Mr. Sallaz has not shown has he holds a valid lien
on any property of the Debtor or bankruptcy estate to secure payment of his fees.
If he bolds valid liens at all (which the Court doubts) such would attach only to his
client's interest in the co-owned property, and not to Debtor's interest in the land.
Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claiJn will be sustained, and the claim

will be disallowed.

C. The motion to revoke the order confirming Debtor's Chapter 13

plan.
Mr. Sallaz asks the Court to revoke its order confinning Debtor's
Chapter 13 plan arguing that Debtor and his attorney engaged in fraud. Motion to
Revoke, Docket No. 29. This is an extremely serious allegation, but, as shown
below, there is nothing in the record to support it. Multiple reasons exist to deny
this motion.
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First, the Court has determined above that Mr. Sallaz is not a
"creditor" in this case. Section § l330(a) provides that an order confirming a plan
may be revoked "[o]n request of a party in interest .... " Under these facts, the
Court seriously doubts Mr. Sallaz has standing to request relief from the Court
Second, even assuming he has standing, or presuming :instead that he
can rely upon the standing of Ms. Mitchell, his client, the motion is not timely
filed. The Code requires that a request to revoke an order confinning a Chapter 13
plan be filed "at any time within 180 days after the date of the entry of an order of

confrrmation under section 1325 of this title ...." 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The
order confrrming Debtor's Amended Chapter 13 Plan was entered on July 9, 2003.
Docket No. l 7. :Vlr. Sallaz did not file his motion to revoke this order until
February 9, 2004. Docket No. 29. Jt appears Mr. Sallaz was given proper, timely
notice of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. No credible explanation has
been offered why Mr. Sallaz, and through him, Ms. Mitchell, failed to involve
themselves in Debtor;s bankruptcy case so that their arguments that Debtor had
grossly undervalued the real estate could have been timely advanced prior to
confinnation. See, e.g., In re Ramey. 301 B.R. 534, 545 (Ban.kr. E.D. Ark. 2003)
("If a creditor fails to object to treatment of its claim in the plan, the creditor will

suffer the consequences."); in re Rupert, 90 I.B.C.R. 2)6, 218 (Banlcr. D. Idaho

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 15
~.,.,\(J 72A

(R~v. M/ls2)

II

DP

D&38

Filed

Co-rted from

I

(imputing knowledge

Entered 04/::ai4 15:28:00
Page 16 2P

relevant notices to the creditor when the notices

were directed to the creditor's attorney).
In disposing of similar motions in the past, the Court has also

considered whether the mov:ing party may alternatively rely upon Bankruptcy Ruic
9024, which incorporates Ped. R. Civ. P. 60, as a basis for setting aside a Chapter

13 confin11ation order. See Carrier v. Croner (Tn re Croner), 99. 1 T.B.C.R. l 6. 18
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1999). However, Rule 9024 provides that while Rule 60 applies
in cases under title 11, ''a complaint to revoke an order con:finning a plan may be
filed only within the time allowed by ... ~ 1330.'' Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024.
Moreover, recent case law on this issue instructs that § 1330, and not Rule 60(b),
is the exclusive basis to seek revocation of a Chapter l 3 confinnation order. 6 See
Mason v. Young (In re Young)) 237 B.R. 791,803 (B.A.P. 10t1• Cir. 1999); Educ.
Credit Afgmt. Corp. v. Robinson (In re Rohinson), 293 B.R. 59, 66 (Bankr. D. Or.

2002).

6 In another case interpreting§ 1330, the comi denied relief when the creditor
knew of the allegedly fraudulent acts prior to confirmation and failed to time1y raise the
issue. Bright v. Ritacco (In re Ritacco), 598 B.R. 595, 598-99 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997)
The Court'il record in this case reflects that Mr. Sallaz had notice of the values Debtor
listed in his schedules well in advance of confirmation. Without expressly adopting the
holding of In re Ritacco, the Court notes it would provide yet another n:ason to deny Ml'.

Sallaz's motion.
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In short, the motion is late~filed and no legitimate basis exists to
disregard the statutory 180-day bar found in § 1330 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Another problem with Mr. Sallaz's approach relates to the procedure
he employed to request relief. The Bankruptcy Rules and case law make it clear
that a party seeking to revoke a Chapter 13 confu'mation order must proceed via an
adversary proceeding. not by motion. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(5) ("The following
are adversary proceedings: ... a proceeding to revoke an order of confim1ation of
a chapter ... 13 plan .... "); see also In re Schumacher, 89 J.B.C.R. 134, 135
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1989) ("An action to revoke an order of confinnation requires the
filing of a complaint in ru1 adversary proceeding."). The procedure used by Mr.
Sallaz in this case is therefore defective.
For each of the above reasons, the motion must be denied. However,
under the circumstances, the Court feels compelled to c011nnent on the merits the
allegations made by Mr. Sallaz against Debtor and his bankruptcy attorney. In
short, Mr. Sallaz totally failed to demonstrate through any competent evidence that
the confinnation order in this case was procured by fraud as required by § 1330(a).
To revoke a Chapter 13 confirmation order on the basis of fraud, the creditor must
prove that: ( l) the debtor made a representation; (2) the debtor knew the
representation was false when it was made; (3) the representation was made with
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intent to deceive; (4) the creditor relied on the representation; and (5)

creditor was damaged as a result of the representation. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v.

Briscoe (In re Briscoe), 90 I.B.C.R. 57, 58-59 (Baukr. D. Idaho 1990).
Here, Debtor testified that the initial figures listed in his bankniptcy
schedules represented his best estimates of the value of the respective properties at
the time of his bankruptcy filing. The Court accepts this testimony. Debtor's
opinion of value was based on his experience in buying and renting the properties.
However, Debtor also explained that he had not visited all the properties during
the course of his divorce proceedings, and as a result, he lacked personal
knowledge about the current condition of the properties 1 and this impacted the
accuracy of his valuation. When Debtor was fiJ1ally able to inspect his properties,

he discovered significant damage had occurred to the premises occasioned by the
tenants' occupancy and the weather. As a result, Debtor felt the properties had
significantly decreased in value. lu addition, the amounts owed on the
encumbrances against the properties had changed over tirne, When Debtor
realized the values and lien balances were substantially different than what he had
listed in his schedules, he amended those schedules. Debtor's testimony stands
unrefuted.
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Mr. Sallaz argues that because the values Debtor listed

his

bankruptcy schedules were lower than those found by the state court in the divorce
action, Debtor's scheduled values were false. Therefore, Mr. Sallaz alleges Debtor
and his attorney must have intended to perpetrate a fraud on t11e bankruptcy court
by advancing the lower values. The evidence fails to support any such inference.

Debtor provided credib 1e testimony as to how he arrived at the values he listed,
why he subsequently amended the values, and why the values were different that
those used by the state court.7 Mr. Sallaz presented no evidence to the contrary.
Mr. Sallaz' s motion to revoke the confinnation order will be denicd. 8

Some of Debtor's testimony on this issue reflects a lack of understanding on his
part concerning how disputed Hens should be taken rnto account in valuing the prope1iics.
In this case, such misunderstand ing is not an indicator of fraud.
7

8 Further comment on the lack of merit conceming this motion is warranted in
this case From all appearances, it is doubtful that Mr. Sallaz or his attomcy conducted
much research, if any, concerning the applicable time limit or approp1iate procedure for
seeking revocation of the confirn1ation order. in addition, given the elements required
under the published case law to prove the confirmation order was procured by fraud, the
Cou1i is skeptical whether there was any factual basis for the relief sought. The
procedural flaws with the motion noted by the Court above, coupled with the dearth of
any evidence that Debtor or his attorney acted improperly, arguably render the motion
frivolous. Debtor and his counsel have not asked for an awurd of attorney fees or costs
incurred in defending against the motion, and the Court will resist the temptation to
independently impose sanctions in this case. instead, the Cou1t strongly recommends that
Mr. Sallaz and his attorney review the mandate of Fed. R. I3ankr. P. 9011 when again
considering filing pleadings in this Court alleging that someone is guilty of fraud.
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Conclusion
The motion to revoke the order confirming Debtor's plan is time
baned, procedurally flawed, and even if it were uot, no competent evidence was
offered at the hearing to show tlrnt the entry of the order was, in any fashion,
procured by fraud. For these reasons, the motion will be denied.

Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz' s proof of claim will be sustained
and the claim will be disallowed. Mr. Sallaz holds no enforceable claim against
Debtor or any property of the bankruptcy estate.
Debtor's objection to Ms. Mitche1l's proof of claim will be sustained

and the claim disallowed in part. Ms. Mitchen has failed to show that she holds a
secured claim against Debtor or the bank:rnptcy estate for the value of her interest

in the paiiies' co-owned real estate. However, she does hold an unsecured claim
against Debtor for $18,000 for the reimbursement ordered by the state divorce
court. Her claim will be allowed in this amount.

DATED This 15•

davi

2004.

-------:li.--J.--

JIM D. PAPPAS
CHIEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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CERTIFfCATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that Tserved by the method
indicated below, a true copy of the document to which this certificate is attached;
to the following named person(s) at the following address(es), on the date slwwn
below:

Office of the U.S. Trustee
jeff. g.howe@usdoj.gov
gary .mccl endon@usdo j. gov
David L. Posey, Esq.
david@davidposey.com

Kelly I. Beeman, Esq.
as surance@.beeman group. org
John Krommenhock
jhk713bk@spro.net

Via Email
Note re E-mail service: A" .pdl" version of the above dcci:-ion/order was electronically transmitted to the
parties indicated above. Email service is provided as a courtesy only upon request of a party. To review
an eloctronic image of the orihr:inal oflhis document, or to subscribe for email service or future
decisions/orders from the Bankruptcy Judges, please access the Court's Internet web site,
'""'"" id.uscourts.gov,

CASE NO.: 03-00998

DATED:

4/15/04
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CAMERON S. BURKE, CLERK
U.S. B
KRUP~RT
· Wirth, Deputy Clerk

